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Abstract 
 
As of January 2012, the Swiss drug maker Roche made a hostile offer of $44,50 USD per share of Illumina, 
a biotechnology company based in the US. This move has been following a consolidating strategy from Roche that 
acquires small and mid-sized companies which will allow its business to develop. The beginning of the 
negotiations was coincident with the beginning of this dissertation and it captured the writer’s attention to 
evaluate such deal. 
Throughout this dissertation, there is a review of literature regarding several topics on valuation and 
M&A, followed by an analysis of both companies and their respective industries. One of the most important 
chapters is related to the companies’ valuations and the assessment of potential synergies from the deal. An offer 
price is suggested along with an offer structure. 
Illumina’s market cap is valued at $5,7 bn, representing an upside potential of 35% against the figures of 
the last trading day of 2011. Synergies are estimated to be of $3,3 bn, mostly due to Roche’s capability to launch 
personalised medicines, as well as its capability to incorporate Illumina’s operations and make it more efficient. 
An offer price of $56,47 is suggested with a deal 100% financed with debt, so that most of the value added is 
received by Roche’s shareholders. 
By the time this thesis was delivered, there was still no agreement between both companies in order to 
close the deal and Illumina asked for $75 per share in the last negotiation, which Roche rejected. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As of January 2012, the Swiss drug maker Roche made a hostile offer of $44,50 USD per share of Illumina, 
a biotechnology company based in the US. This move has been following a consolidating strategy from Roche that 
acquires small and mid-sized companies which will allow its business to develop. As stated in Roche’s latest 
annual report, “Our goal is to lead through innovations in science by combining the critical mass of Big Pharma 
with the flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit of smaller business units”. The special interest in Illumina is related 
with its gene sequencing technology that would allow Roche to develop state-of-the-art therapies, customised for 
each patient. 
Since the negotiations would occur during the development of this dissertation, it seemed appealing to 
explore this deal. As a cross-border acquisition, it was also a good way to perform a more interesting analysis. 
Moreover, As Roche and Illumina are at two different stages in their life-cycle, two different perspectives would 
have to be considered for the valuation assumptions. Lack of information, especially from such a recent company 
as Illumina was one of the challenges, as well as the complexity of the healthcare industry. 
After several rounds of negotiation and considerable speculation, Illumina consistently rejected Roche’s 
offer – $51 USD per share was the final offer in April, totalling a $7 billion deal. By the end of December the deal 
resurfaced with Illumina asking for a price of $75 per share, which Roche rejected.  
In this dissertation, both companies will be valued, potential synergies will be accounted and an offer 
price will be proposed. These figures will then be compared with Roche’s offer, in order to ascertain whether it 
was a good move on the part of Illumina to reject the deal or if, on the other hand, Roche acted well in its 
decision to walk away and not raise the price above $51 USD.  
The literature review section presents an overview of the academic perspective on company valuation 
and mergers and acquisitions. This chapter is important to understand which are considered the best practices, in 
order to reach a valuation and to build up an acquisition strategy that is as accurate as possible. 
Relying on available data, an industry and both companies’ analysis are performed. This section sums up 
relevant financial data to be considered when assumptions about the companies have to be made in the 
valuation section. Both companies will be valued at a point in time before the announcement of the offer 
(standalone valuation) and then the merged entity will be valued, subsequently incorporating the possible 
synergies. A strategy for the acquisition has to be built and it is important to assess which players would benefit 
from such a deal. 
Finally, a comparison with reality is undertaken, in order to understand why the deal did not take place so 
far. It is important to mention that, no matter how deep the analysis performed and how detailed the forecasts 
are, it is impossible to reach an exact, 100% accurate value, since guessing the future is not possible and many 
factors may change and lead to different results in the years to come. Above all, the most important thing is to 
exercise a logical rationale that would fit the best practices to analyse such deals. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, several academic aspects regarding M&A and Company Valuation will be addressed. By 
analysing different academic studies, one can find information to help decide which valuation method is more 
appropriate in each case or which risk premium should be considered in a cross-border deal. In the following 
pages, the relevant literature for this thesis will be addressed, additionally considering some alternatives and 
points of discussion that although are not applicable for the case, are worthy of mention. 
 
2.1. Literature on Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
2.1.1. Types of M&A 
 
There are different classifications to identify types of M&A. For instance, Ross et. al (2003) mention two 
different ways to categorize M&As – legal procedures and the typical financial analysts’ classification. 
Within the legal procedures, there are three distinct deals: 
 Merger or Consolidation – In a merger, the buyer absorbs the target company, acquiring all the 
assets and liabilities and through a consolidation, a new firm is created, aggregating both 
companies, leading to a new legal entity. Both types of deals need the approval of the involved 
companies’ stockholders, generally, by a favourable vote from, at least, two-thirds of the total 
shares. 
 Acquisition of Stock – The acquirer makes an offer for the target’s stocks. Usually, this operation 
is performed through a tender offer, i.e. buying the target’s shares making a public offer for the 
shareholders of that firm.  A general meeting is not necessary since the buyer deals directly with 
the shareholders. However, it may be difficult to buy the entire company as it is up to each and 
every shareholder’s decision whether to sell the shares or not. 
 Acquisition of Assets – The bidding company buys all the assets from the target. It requires a 
formal approval from the shareholders and transferring the ownership of those assets may be 
costly. 
 
According to the typical financial analysts’ classification, the deals are characterized as follows: 
 Horizontal Acquisition – Both the bidding and the target companies are from the same industry, 
competing in their product market. 
 Vertical Acquisition – The firms are from a different stage in the production process. One can take 
as an example the acquisition of a travel agency by an airline company. 
 Conglomerate Acquisition – The companies involved in the deal are not related at all, being from 
different industries. 
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Damodaran (2002) presents a classification similar to the above mentioned legal procedures type and he 
adds another classification for a deal when it is not a company acquiring a second one, but instead, a company is 
acquired by its own management team (Management Buyout) or by a group of investors, usually making the 
acquisition with a high level of debt (Leverage Buyout). 
 
2.1.2. One Plus One Equals Three – The Reasoning for M&As 
 
 There are different motives for companies to engage in M&A deals. Some of the most commonly 
mentioned across academic papers are the acquisition of undervalued companies, diversification by buying firms 
from other businesses, synergies (operating and/or financial), the acquisition of badly managed companies or 
even just for managerial self-interest. Bower (2001) outlines distinct strategic objectives and major concerns 
regarding the different reasons for M&A deals. Either by an attempt to deal with overcapacity or by a roll-up of 
local competitors, the bidder is looking for growth and market share. One should be concerned with the problems 
that may arise from such deals. Through the aggregation of several companies, there may be a conflict in terms of 
culture or operations. Usually, there is a rationalization of costs and the acquired company’s employees are more 
affected by the layoffs. If the deal is a merger of equals (companies of roughly the same size), there may be strong 
arguments for cost cutting decisions, which values to implement, how to manage organizational culture conflicts 
and, especially, who will take management control.  
Another interesting perspective is the acquisition of companies as a substitute for R&D or to exploit a new 
industry that is likely to become important in the market. These strategies would imply entering into new fields 
but could also be a source of diversification for the company, thus diminishing the company’s risk. As for the 
substitution for R&D, the company may be acquiring some start-ups in the same industry. As far as main issues 
that may arise are concerned, these are related with cultural aspects and being able to provide the freedom that 
is necessary for the creative process. When it concerns a strategic shift towards other industries, management 
should focus their efforts on due diligence and ensure that they understand the new market that will be 
addressed. 
 There may be other less financial aspects such as testimonials and success stories that may influence 
managers towards this type of deal. Kummer and Steger (2008) performed a study on M&A waves and they 
mention that “Testimonial evidence about businesses at conferences and in the media tells us that some M&A 
have (supposedly) been a huge success” but “…when these success stories are examined in detail, it is often 
difficult to measure whether they really were successful.” Companies also suffer external pressures for growth, 
especially those that are listed. When there are no more sources of internal growth, M&A can present itself as a 
viable strategy to continue expansion. Also, some managers have the self-interest to become emperors in the 
industry and make as many acquisitions as possible in a show of power. 
 Goedhart et. al (2010) identify five types of successful acquisitions, namely those that improve the 
performance of the target company, consolidate companies in the industry in order to remove excess capacity, 
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buying small companies either to provide them with easier market access, to take advantage of their skills or 
technologies or simply by betting on future winners in the market. Again, some of these deals are surrounded by 
a lot of uncertainty and therefore, one should develop a well-planned strategy for value creation. The authors 
also refer to a roll-up strategy or buying undervalued companies as strategies that may not lead to value creation. 
The first is easily copied by competitors and the second is not simple to spot, since the company would need to be 
evaluating the target with better precision than the market. 
 
2.1.3. The Power of Synergies 
 
When several CFOs in the United States were asked about their reasons for M&A deals, a large majority 
mentioned synergies (37,3%) and diversification (29,3%) as the principal motives. In order to understand such 
preponderance of this reason for an acquisition, one should start by understanding the meaning of this concept. 
“Synergy is the additional value that is generated by combining two firms, creating opportunities that would not 
have been available to these firms operating independently” as Damodaran (2005) considers. In the same 
working paper, the author categorizes different types of synergies: 
 Operating Synergies – these will generally lead to higher expected cash flows for the company 
and can be materialized through economies of scale achieving cost-efficiency, greater pricing 
power by reducing competition, combination of different functional strengths or higher growth in 
new existing markets, mostly in cross-border mergers. 
 Financial Synergies – these can either lead to higher expected cash flows or lowering the discount 
rate at which the companies are valued. These synergies can be achieved through the 
combination of a company with excess cash but narrowed growth opportunities with a company 
with highly profitable projects but limited cash. Increase the company’s debt capacity and benefit 
from tax savings are other reasons. Finally, diversification (which is the second reason presented 
in the survey above mentioned) is also subject of financial synergy as it may lower the discount 
rate. 
 
But while, managers rely on synergies to justify acquisitions, there is a lot of uncertainty as to whether 
they actually materialize. Reasons such as exploring new markets or combining functional strengths are so 
intangible that they should not be considered, once a priori, they cannot be reflected into currency. Moreover, 
one should not only account for the benefits from potential synergies but also consider the costs the company 
would incur to achieve them. Ficery et. al (2007) identify six common mistakes related with synergies, the most 
relevant being the incorrect definition of synergies, either too narrow or too broad and missing the window of 
opportunity to achieve those synergies, since around three quarters of the value captured from synergies occurs 
during the first year after the deal, thus there should be a special focus on the first years to capture all the added 
value that was suggested. 
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2.1.4. Cross-Border M&A 
  
With the increased globalization of markets, labour, capital, goods and services are easier to trade. This 
facilitates investments abroad and companies look for growth, especially in emerging markets where there are 
attractive opportunities to grow the business. Zenner et. al (2008) identify long and short-term drivers for cross-
border M&A as well as possible factors that might reduce this trend. Globalization and geographical 
diversification increase scale for the firm and afford the opportunity to explore new markets. The trend towards 
deregulation and the consequent free flow of capital and goods also prospers this trend to look for external 
markets. From a short-term perspective, high relative equity valuation of target companies predicts growth 
potential. The authors also mentioned that the weakness of USD makes US-based companies less valuable and 
investing abroad can reduce that risk. Moreover, sovereign wealth funds have gained relevance in the market and 
major investments are made overseas in order to offset possible adverse cycles affecting the country. As an 
example we can take the recent set of investments made by the Chinese Government in companies based in 
several different countries. However, these short-term factors can change without notice and alter the context in 
which such deals are made. Also, one should take protectionism laws of the foreign country into account. This 
issue is especially relevant in emerging markets, where there is a higher degree of uncertainty. 
 In terms of valuation, it is important to take into account some aspects that may differ due to the nature 
of a cross-border deal. Froot (1997) refers some aspects such as: 
 Taxes – countries have different corporate tax rates and regimes. Using the higher corporate tax 
rate is assumed to be a good conservative assumption. Also, it is important to analyse whether 
the foreign country offers any type of tax exemptions for international investments and thus 
account for any effect this might have during the relevant period. 
 Different Currencies – a cross-border deal may occur with two firms that operate in different 
currencies. In order to make the valuation one can estimate in the foreign currency FCFF, convert 
to the domestic currency and obtain the firm value by discounting with a home currency discount 
rate, accounting for the necessary risk adjustments (country, asset and financial risks). 
Alternatively, the entire valuation can be performed in the foreign currency. Cash flows, 
respective discount rate and the final result will then be converted to the domestic currency using 
a spot foreign exchange rate. Zenner et. al (2008) also present these alternatives and both 
methods lead to the same result. 
 Adjusting the valuation for possible additional risk in the foreign country, such as expropriation or 
inflation risk for instance. This can be achieved by either adding a risk premium to the discount 
rate (this would assume that this risk is constant over time) or by accounting for these potential 
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Chari et. al (2010) analysed acquirer returns three days either side of the announcement day of the deal 
for developed-market acquirer and emerging-market targets between 1986 and 2006 and concluded that, on 
average, there is a statistically significant increase of 1,16% in acquirer’s returns compared to developed-market 
acquirer and target deals. 
 Although this dissertation analyses a cross-border deal, both companies are based in developed markets, 
therefore some of the considerations above stated will not be addressed, as for instance, there may be a lower 
risk exposure due to a lower level of uncertainty. 
 
2.1.5. Methods of Payment and Their Implications 
 
 Two common methods of payment can be identified: common stock exchange or cash offers. There is a 
general agreement in academia regarding the implications of selecting either one of the methods. Usually, 
mergers are paid for through common stock exchange, while tender offers are transacted with cash, as Travlos 
(1987) stated in his work. The same author concludes that, upon announcement, the shareholders’ returns on the 
bidding firm suffer significant losses while cash offer deals do not lead to abnormal rates of return (either positive 
or negative). A recent study by Hazelkorn et. al (2004) lead to the same conclusion. Moreover, the authors 
pointed out that in the long term (over a two-year period) “cash-financed acquirers outperformed industry peers 
by 4,3% while stock-financed acquirers underperformed industry peers by 5,2%”. 
Both articles mention the signalling effect of the payment methods. An equity-financed transaction tends 
to signal overpriced stocks. Also, if the transaction is paid through exchange of stocks, the target company’s 
shareholders will not only capture the risk of the deal but also, the potential synergies. If the management is 
certain about the future gains, there is no incentive to share it with other shareholders. On the other hand, a cash 
offer sends positive signals to the market, since it represents the acquirer's confidence in re-establishing the cash 
balance as well as confining all the potential gains from the deal to the existing shareholders.  
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) consider the acquirer’s financing decision to be driven by the cost of 
capital and the company will seek the cheapest way of financing and structuring the method of payment taking 
that into consideration. When there is a cash offer, especially financed through debt, managers tend to have 
more incentives to benefit from synergies earlier, as it is crucial to repay debt. 
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2.2. Literature on Valuation 
 
2.2.1. Valuation Techniques 
 
There are several valuation methods that one can use to obtain the value of a company or investment. 
Damodaran (2002) provides a classification of different approaches to valuation and they are presented as such: 
 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Valuation – Based on the Present Value of an asset or its expected 
future cash flows. The type of cash flows to be used and the discount rate to be applied are the 
main differentiators of the different models within this category. Examples: 
o Equity Valuation – discounting expected Free Cash Flows to Equity at the cost of Equity. 
o Firm Valuation – discounting expected Free Cash Flows to the Firm at the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) or using the Adjusted Present Value (APV), which is a sum 
of two components: the firm value as if the company was only equity financed plus the 
present value of tax shields. 
 Relative Valuation – Valuation of an asset comparing it with similar assets in terms of a variable 
as, for instance, cash flows, earnings, sales or book value. Examples: 
o Price to Cash Flow, Price to Earnings Ratio, Price to Sales, Price to Book Value, Price to 
Dividend Yield. 
 Contingent Claim Valuation – Valuation of assets with such characteristics that one can apply the 
option pricing models. As an example, an oil company can value the option to explore an 
undeveloped oil reserve. The options vary from firm to firm and it can be applied to either 
financial or real assets. These options can be valued through the Black and Scholes Model or the 
Binomial Option Pricing Model. 
 
Young et. al (1999) compared distinct valuation methods and assumed that it is indifferent which model is 
used as they should all lead to similar values. The authors state that it is possible to identify the assumptions that 
make the value of a company change from one method to another. 
 
2.2.2. Discounting Cash Flow Valuation 
 
2.2.2.1. Equity Valuation 
 
This model gives the equity value of a firm. It is based on free cash flows to equity (FCFE), which can be 
seen as the cash flows that the firm can afford to distribute to its shareholders after all the financial obligations, 
capital expenditures and working capital needs are met. As Koller et. al (2005) state, there is a second way to 
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compute free cash flows to equity as “dividends plus share repurchases minus new equity issues”, leading to 
similar values. 
It is important to mention that dividends and free cash flows to equity may not be the same. The FCFE 
represent the cash available to be paid out to stockholders but the firm may be paying more or less dividends to 
its shareholders. Damodaran (2002) identifies desire for stability in dividends payment, future investment needs 
and increases in dividends payments as positive signalling effects and likewise, reasons why FCFE and dividends 
tend to be different in value. Actually, investors expect to have increasing dividend payments over the years. As 
this dividends policy may influence the analysis of the equity value, using the Dividend Discount Model may be 
misleading. 
 
2.2.2.2. Firm Valuation using WACC and APV 
 
These two models discount Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FCFF) to their present value but at different 
discount rates. The FCFF is defined as the sum of cash available to repay all claim holders. Luehrman (1997) 
provides an example on how to compute the FCFF. In general terms, FCFF is given by EBIT (1- Corporate Tax Rate) 
plus Depreciation, minus Capital Expenditure, minus Changes in Net Working Capital. 
The same author compares the two alternatives to reach the enterprise value. In the WACC-based 
method, the cash flows are discounted at a weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which incorporates all the 
financial effects, namely any benefits or costs related with the leverage in the capital structure of the firm. The 
major drawback off this method is that either the firm has a stable capital structure, or one needs to compute a 
new discount rate, i.e. a new WACC every period the capital structure is changed, which may be challenging. The 
formula to compute the WACC is given by: 
 
     
 
 
               
 
 
   
 
This way, the portion of debt will be discounted at a cost of debt, accounting also for the tax shields, while 
the portion of equity will be discounted at the cost of equity. 
On the other hand, the APV method consists of the sum of two components: the valuation of the firm as if 
it was all equity financed, therefore discounting the FCFF at an unlevered cost of capital plus the value of interest 
tax shields discounted at the cost of debt. In the article, APV is said to be a better tool as it works even when the 
WACC method cannot be applied. Also, for managerial decisions, APV is richer in information, since the financial 
effects can be clearly identified from the value of the project/assets of the company itself. This allows managers 
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2.2.3. Relative Valuation 
 
With this method, a company is valued through a comparison with other similar firms in the market. 
Damodaran (2002) states that it is necessary to have standardized prices, as it is not possible to simply compare 
share prices, since companies have different number of shares. Thus, “converting prices into multiples of 
earnings, book values or sales” is an option to overcome this bias. Goedhart et. al (2005) affirm that performing 
this comparison with other firms in the market is a good reality check for the necessary assumptions for the 
forecasting period in the DCF approaches. When there are significant differences in those assumptions, it is 
possible to verify if either the companies indeed have different performances or if the assumptions are incorrect. 
One can compute several multiples as for instance Price to Earnings Ratio, Price to Book Value and 
Enterprise Value to Sales. One can either estimate the market value of the assets of the firm or the equity value, 
depending on whether we use price or enterprise value multiples. 
The multiples are straightforward and simple to calculate and the value of the company can therefore be 
easily derived. The main challenge however, is to identify which companies in the market are comparable with 
the one being valued, i.e. defining the peer group. Kaplan and Ruback (1996) point out three different measures 
to determine the peer group: comparable company, where the multiple is “calculated from the trading values of 
firms in the same industry as the firm being valued”; comparable transaction having multiples “from companies 
that were involved in a similar transaction” and comparable industry transaction, which comprises of multiples of 
firms from the same industry with similar transactions. Goedhart et. al (2005) suggest the use of companies with 
“similar expectations for growth and ROIC”. 
Liu et. al (2002) provide a ranking of the multiples regarding their proximity to stock prices. They conclude 
that the multiples with bigger explanatory power are the ones based on forward earnings, historical earnings and 
cash flow measures. When deciding on the multiples to estimate the value of Roche and Ilumina, these will 
certainly be taken into account.  
Kaplan and Ruback (1996) compare multiples valuation with the discounted cash flow methods and 
conclude that the DCF approaches perform better. However, the DCF approach would gain explanatory power 
when combined with the information provided by the multiples valuation. 
 
2.2.4. Contingent Claim Valuation 
 
Through the application of real options, managers can assess whether implementing a new project will be 
profitable and if so, the appropriate timing. Copeland and Keenan (1998) identify several sectors where real 
options can be applied, one of which is the pharmaceutical industry. Real options may be useful to valuate R&D 
projects and define which ones should be applied first. R&D is surrounded by technological uncertainty (whether 
or not the outcome will lead to a new product) as well as market uncertainty (whether or not there will be 
demand for that new product). The authors, however, maintain that attempts to apply real options are still too 
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simplistic to provide relevant results. Nevertheless, in a strategic sense, this is a good method to understand the 
uncertainties faced by the firms when deciding to embrace new projects. 
 
2.2.5. Putting It to Practice 
  
When developing the deal valuation, some estimates will need to be made. In this section of the Literature 
Review, the major issues for estimating cash flows and computing the discount rates necessary for the valuation 
of the Roche & Ilumina deal will be addressed. 
 
2.2.5.1. Estimating CF 
 
In order to use the WACC and APV methods, it is necessary to first calculate the Free Cash Flows to the 
Firm (FCFF), as already mentioned. The formula to calculate it is as follows: 
 
                                                                        
 
 The cash flows are computed each year while the company’s performance varies. After a few years (three 
to ten years in general), the steady state is assumed and FCFF are assumed to be a perpetuity with or without a 
certain yearly growth rate. This final year of estimation is called the Terminal Value and is given by: 
 
               
      
                         
 
 
Young et. al (1999) consider terminal value to be “by far the most important element in any valuation 
estimate”. In fact, as the explicit period (first years of estimates) represents only few years, at the end, terminal 
value will represent about 80% to 90% of the market value estimate. Regarding the terminal value, expected 
growth can be estimated by multiplying the firm’s reinvestment rate by the return on capital as Damodaran 
(2002) states. Moreover, Kaplan and Ruback (1996) assume that in the terminal value period capital expenditures 
(CAPEX) should be at least as large as depreciation and amortization, once it is assumed to be a growing 
perpetuity. 
As this dissertation is based on a cross-border deal, special factors are to be taken into account. The firms 
have their accounts in two different currencies and the tax rates are different. These issues were already 
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2.2.5.2. Compute the Discount Rates 
 
Once the cash flows are computed, the next step is to obtain the present value of the firm. In order to do 
so, it is necessary to use a suitable discount rate. This rate will depend on the valuation method that is used. As 
for the WACC method, one must compute the cost of equity (levered) and the cost of debt. For the APV 
methodology, the unlevered cost of equity and the cost of debt are necessary. 
 
 Cost of Equity 
 
There are several asset-pricing models useful to estimate the cost of equity of a firm. These models determine 
the expected return on a company’s stock that would compensate the risk assumed by the investor. Koller et. al 
(2005) identify three models as the most commonly used – Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French 
Three-Factor Model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 
 
CAPM 
This model was first developed by William Sharpe in 1964. The author outlines that an investor will 
demand a return that represents the sum of the return on a risk-free rate plus an additional premium to 
compensate for the risk exposure. “In effect, the market presents him [the investor] with two prices: the price of 
time, or the pure interest rate and the price of risk, the expected return per unit of risk borne” mentioned Sharpe 
(1964). 
The cost of equity can be computed as: 
                      
Where: 
      – Expected return on a stock of company i. 
   – Risk-free rate. 
   – Beta of company i – stock’s covariance with the market. 
      – Expected return on the market index. 
Moreover, the difference between the expected return on the market index and the risk-free rate 
           represents the Equity Risk Premium. It can be seen as the outperformance of risky assets over a 
risk-free asset, leading again to the idea of a premium to compensate for risk. 
 
Therefore, one needs to determine the risk-free rate, the beta for the company and the equity risk 
premium in order to come up with an estimate for the cost of equity. 
 Risk-free rate – to estimate the  , the common practice is to consider government bonds with no 
default risk. Koller et. al (2005) identify the 10-year US government bond as a good proxy for the 
risk-free rate in the valuation of US based companies, while the 10-year German Eurobond is 
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suggested for the valuation of European companies. In the case of this thesis, the 10-year Swiss 
government bond can be used to value Roche, since this asset is also stable and riskless. 
 Beta – in order to compute the beta, a regression of the stock’s returns against the market’s 
returns is performed. Beta is given by the covariance between the firm and the market. According 
to Koller et. al (2005), “company stock returns should be regressed against a value-weighted, well 
diversified portfolio, such as the S&P 500 or MSCI World Index”. In order to improve the beta 
estimate, one should look at the betas for similar companies in the same industry. When 
computing the beta, the effect of the company’s leverage is incorporated. One can determine the 
unlevered beta (accounting only for operating risks) with the following relationship: 
 
     (  
 
 
             ) 
 
As a final consideration, depending on the valuation method, the levered (WACC) or unlevered 
(APV) cost of equity will be computed. In order to do so, it is necessary to match the cost of equity 
with the corresponding beta, i.e. for levered cost of equity, one must use the levered beta and the 
same applies for the unlevered. 
 Equity Risk Premium – There are several methods to estimate the Equity Risk Premium. 
Damadoran (2012) identify three common practices: obtain the market expectations by surveying 
investors and managers; use the historical premium as a proxy for the future; estimate an implied 
premium by looking at the market rates and prices on the assets today. The author suggests that 
the best approach for valuation is to use the implied equity risk premium, since this was the 
approach with the best predictive power. As already mentioned in the Cross-border M&A topic, 
one should account for an additional country risk premium when considering less stable markets. 
Moreover, when valuing a global company, one can use a global equity index as for instance the 
Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) to determine the Equity Risk Premium. 
 
Fama-French Three-Factor Model and APT 
Fama and French (1996) presented a model that is able to overcome some anomalies in the CAPM. 
According to the authors, “average returns on common stocks are related to firm characteristics like size, 
earnings/price, cash flow/price, book-to-market equity, past sales growth, long-term past return, and short-term 
past return”. The Three-Factor model is given by the following regression: 
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Where SMB and HML correspond to the difference between the return on two portfolios, respectively, 
small stocks minus big stocks (SMB) and high book-to-market stocks minus low book-to-market stocks (HML). The 
first factor is the equity risk premium as already seen in the CAPM model. 
The APT can be seen as a generalized version of the Fama-French model. Generally, the logic applied is 
similar, but this model has k factors, as much as the considered relevant to determine the excess return on a 
company’s stocks. Koller et. al (2005) consider this model to be too theoretical and of difficult implementation as 
“there is little agreement about how many factors there are, what the factors represent, or how to measure the 
factors”. 
 
 Cost of Debt 
 
A good proxy for the cost of debt of a firm is its yield to maturity on long-term, highly liquid, option-free 
bonds (Koller et. al 2005). However, this rate is a promised rate and thus it may not be the most suitable one to 
discount expected cash flows. The authors state that this proxy is applicable for companies with an investment-
grade debt of BBB or better.  
In other situations, one should use the bond ratings provided by the rating agencies, as for instance S&P or 
Moody’s and add up the respective spread to the risk-free rate. Damodaran (2002) provides a third perspective 
where the interest coverage ratio (EBIT/Interest Expenses) of the firm is computed and compared with the ratios 
of rated firms, applying a spread based on the spread of those firms. 
  
 




































Fritz Hoffmann-La Roche founded the company in 1896 with the same vision that guides Roche today – 
manufacturing high quality drugs and to distribute them internationally. By 1912, Roche had already expanded it 
business on three continents, across nine different countries. Currently, Roche operates in more than 150 
countries. The company has been growing through several acquisitions of innovative companies that, through 
time, allowed Roche to develop its products and being in the edge of innovation. Roche employs around 80,000 
people worldwide. 
The company’s operations can be segmented into two different areas: pharmaceuticals and diagnostics. 
Within each area there are smaller divisions, being the pharmaceuticals area divided into three fields: Roche 
Pharmaceuticals, Genentech and Chugai; and the diagnostics area has five distinct fields: Applied Science, 
Diabetes Care, Molecular Diagnostics, Tissue Diagnosis and Professional Diagnostics. In general terms, Roche is a 
producer and developer of drugs for the treatment of several diseases and it also develops diagnostic instruments 
for the detection, prevention and treatment of patients. In terms of R&D, the company focuses its efforts in 
therapeutic areas such as oncology, virology, inflammation, metabolic disorders, and central nervous system. 
Roche has its operations spread worldwide. According to each segment there is a different division as it is possible 
to see in the charts below. 
The North American and European markets are at utmost importance for the company. As a matter of 
fact, 37% of the Pharmaceuticals Segment Sales are for the US market followed by Western Europe (Fig.1). For 
the Diagnostics Segment Sales, 50% of sales are for the EMEA (Europe, the Middle East and Africa) market (Fig.2). 
Since 2009, the total amount of sales has declined being 
this value equal to 42.531 million CHF in 2011 (Fig.3). This 
represents a 10% decrease when comparing with the 47.473 
million CHF in 2010, which was already reflecting a 3% decline 
from the 2009 amount. For this 4-year period, the CAGR was 
equal to -1.74%. The Diagnostics segment has been gaining 
 
Estela Lucas M&A: The Roche’s Offer for Illumina 19 
relevance in the total business, increasing its weight on total sales from 20,5% in 2009 to 22,9% in 2011.  
 
Another important issue is the fact that 
the cost of sales has been falling through time 
(Fig.4). One of the factors leading to this reduction 
is the decrease in royalties payments, which expire 
through time. Nevertheless, when looking at the 
company’s annual report, it is stated that sales 
actually grew 1% at Constant Exchange Rates, 
however as the Swiss Franc has been 
strengthening against other currencies, it 
impacted severely the results. When comparing 
cost of Sales relatively to total sales, the ratio has 
been quite stable, albeit with a decreasing trend. 
In this account, there is no impact of exchange rates, mostly because Roche has the majority of its cost base 




Illumina was founded in 1998 by David Walt, Larry Bock, John Stuelpnagel, Anthony Czarnik, Mark Chee – 
a group of scientific experts and venture capital investors. The company went public in 2000. This innovative 
company offers products and services for the analysis of genetic variation and function. In 2002, Illumina 
launched its first system – Illumina BeadLab. In 2007, it was named the fastest growing high-tech company by 
Forbes. Currently, its portfolio has more than 10 instruments and assays available to address state of the art 
disease research, drugs development, molecular tests and genetics analysis. 
 Illumina’s operations are divided in two segments: Life Sciences and Diagnostics. The Life Sciences 
segment comprises all products and services related with the research market, while the Diagnostics segment 
explores the molecular diagnostics field. So far, the Diagnostics segment represented a very small percentage of 
the operations and the company presents its results as a whole. According to the company’s most recent annual 
report (2012), the results of the operations will be reported in two segments once the Diagnostics segment 
represents more than 10% of revenues, operating profit or loss, or assets of the total business. 
The company sells its products and services in North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific regions, its 
customers in general are academic and government research centres, pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies. As of the beginning of 2012, the company employed around 2,200 people. 
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In Fig.5 one can simply deduce that the US market is the most important one for the company, 
representing 50% of total sales. Moreover, if we add up the UK and Rest of Europe markets, these will represent 
three quarters of total sales. Since 2008, total sales have been increasing (Fig.6), representing a CAGR of 16,5% for 
this period. Consequently, the total cost of sales also increased, but when analysing in relative terms, the cost of 
sales represent around 30% of total sales. In 2011, there was a slightly improvement in this ratio when comparing 
with 2010 (from 33,3% to 32,8% of sales). 
 
3.3. Industry Review 
 
Both companies’ businesses belong to the healthcare sector, although in different industries. Roche’s 




According to IMS Health, the world market for pharmaceuticals represented $ 856 bn in 2010. This 
market has been growing for the past few years. Since 2003, the annual growth rate has been around 7%. 
Geographically, North America and Europe represent the largest markets, as it is possible to see in Fig.7, where 
these markets together represent more than 50% of the total market size. 
Fig. 7 – Pharmaceuticals Market Size and 
growth estimates 













Total Market Size $ 856,4 - 6,2% 4 - 5% 3 - 6% 
North America $ 334,7 39,1% 4,6% 2 - 3% 0 - 3% 
Europe $ 245,3 28,6% 5,6% 2 - 3% 2 - 5% 
Asia/Africa/Australia $ 126,5 14,8% 14,5% 12 - 13% 11 - 14% 
Japan $ 96,5 11,3% 2,6% 5 - 6% 2 - 5% 
Latin America $ 53,4 6,2% 12,1% 11 - 12% 11 - 14% 
 
37,7%  31,8%  33,3%  
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 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to observe 
that for the past few years, the 
Asia/Africa/Australia and Latin American markets 
have experienced higher growth rates, this being a 
trend expected to continue in the future with 
predicted CAGR between 11% and 14% for these 
markets for the period 2011-2015. 
The Pharmaceuticals industry is very 
fragmented. Pfizer’s sales represent 7% of total 
sales and this is the company with higher market 
share. Actually, the Top 10 companies, in terms of sales, represent roughly 45% of total market share. Roche is 
positioned in 7th place having a 4,17% market share. In such a fragmented and competitive industry, it is 
important to understand what drives growth. There are several important factors worthy of mention: 
 Exposure to Patent Expiration – loss of market exclusivity leads to higher competition and tougher 
commercial conditions. Therefore, patent expiration is a major issue for companies and it is 
necessary to have a forward looking approach to this fact, since it will have a negative impact for 
the companies losing their patent rights, declining revenues in the future. 
 Expansion of Emerging Markets Portfolio – diversification into emerging markets is key to success, 
not only due to the growth potential of this ascending market but also to overcome patents 
expiration in western countries, along with the austerity measures that have slowed down the 
healthcare spending. The rise of a middle-class in emerging markets, with higher income levels, 
will allow families to spend more on healthcare and additionally governments can invest more in 
providing better health services and products. Therefore, companies should not miss out on this 
opportunity for growth. 
 Barriers to Generic competition – with the expiration of patents, there is a fiercer competition 
from generic products. Nevertheless, the legal and regulatory requirements may delay the 
process, especially in areas related to biologics, respiratory devices and vaccines, creating higher 
barriers to entry. Thus, companies should analyse their portfolios in order to understand how 
generic products may affect their business. 
 Value-creating innovation – investing in R&D does not immediately translate into new products. 
Achieving success in developing new medicines, passing through all the regulatory requirements 
and launching them in the market is what generates value. Thus, what is important is not the 












Fig.8 - Share of the Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies 
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Concerning the current economic situation, there are two other important factors to take into account, 
from the Government and Institutions perspectives and also from the patients perspectives. The austerity 
measures, translated in this case by Healthcare budget cuts, have an impact on R&D investment, expenditure on 
medicines and the purchase of state-of-the art technology for Health Institutions. On the other hand, there is an 
increasing elasticity of demand, since patients may have lower purchasing power and be more price-sensitive. 
 
3.3.2. Life Science Tools 
  
This industry is highly fragmented as it is possible to identify in Fig.9, although four major players can be 
distinguished by their higher market shares (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Quest Diagnostics, Agilent Technologies and 
LabCorp).  
 
According to a Goldman Sachs Equity Research, Life Science Tools was the worst-performing industry in 
the healthcare sector, mostly due to the concerns around austerity measures that have impact on academic and 
government funding. Nevertheless, in 2012, this industry was the second best performer as these concerns are 
slightly fading away, as R&D funding recovers, and there is a positive expectation for future funding. In the US the 
debate still goes on regarding the budget for the National Institute of Health (the uncertainty will endure until a 
final decision is reached). However, in an election year, there is a higher likelihood for no or low cuts in the 
budget. In the EU, the funding has been quite stable in regions such as UK, Germany and Scandinavia. Finally, 
China is seen as a key country for the development of this industry as the government intends to increase its R&D 






4,7% 4,5% 4,3% 3,7% 3,5% 3,4% 3,1% 2,2% 2,0% 2,9% 
Fig.9 - Market Share in the Life Science Tools Industry in terms of Total Sales 
Source: Goldman Sachs Equity Research on 
Medical Technology (2011) 
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Similarly to the Pharmaceuticals industry, key growth drivers are related to government and academic 
spending in R&D, new products adoption (value-creating innovation), expansion into emerging markets (higher 
growth perspectives) and pricing (important factor in a such fragmented market). 
 
Moreover, Life Science Tools is a cyclical industry with a high correlation between its organic growth and 
global GDP growth (R2 = 73% according to Goldman Sachs). Fig.10 shows the comparison between Global GDP 
growth and Life Science Tools growth and generally, the industry growth follows GDP growth, albeit with a higher 
degree of volatility. This makes total sense, as this industry, as well as the entire sector, relies so much on R&D 
spending, which is also cyclical alongside the market. 
 
To conclude, there is on one hand, a mature and competitive market such as pharmaceuticals and on the 
other hand, a market highly fragmented, still developing and facing a downturn due to the dependence on R&D 
investments which have been affected by the government budget cuts for that purpose. After gaining some 
knowledge about the context, the following step is to proceed for the valuation of the companies and the deal 
itself. 
  
Fig.10 – Comparison of Global GDP growth and Life Science Tools organic growth 
Source: Goldman Sachs 
Equity Research on Life 
Science Tools and 
Diagnostics (2012) 
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4. Valuation 
 
In this chapter, the quantitative analysis of the proposed deal will be addressed. The first step is to make a 
standalone valuation of the target company (Illumina) in order to reach a fair price of the company before 
accounting for any synergies from the merger. Since the announcement of the offer in January of 2012, the 
valuation of Illumina will be carried out as of December of 2011, i.e. a pre-bid date.  
The same will apply for Roche’s valuation, which will lead to the second step – the standalone valuation of 
the acquirer company. It is important to compute the fair price of Roche, so that one can arrive at the value of the 
merged entity. This step will comprise of two phases. In the first instance, both firms’ values are summed up and 
subsequently, the synergies are incorporated into the valuation. The difference between these two values will 
infer the synergy value. 
These valuations are based on the data available from the companies’ reports obtained from their 
respective websites, Damodaran’s and Reuters’ websites and Equity Research studies from Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley. 
 
4.1. Standalone Valuation of Illumina 
 
In order to identify a price target for the firm, Illumina will be valued using the WACC method. Being a 
younger firm, Illumina is still in its growth phase, experiencing high volatility in relation to its margins. The 
decision to choose between a valuation method that uses FCFE or FCFF was relatively simple and is related to the 
fact that the company has no dividends distribution and there is no intention to do so in the forthcoming years. 
Also, its stock repurchases policy has been quite unstable throughout past years, which makes it difficult to set a 
trend and forecast future free cash flows to equity. Moreover, the company has been issuing convertible senior 
notes that give investors the option to convert their rights into shares. Thus, the FCFF approach will be 
considered. 
In this section, the main assumptions regarding the forecast of Cash Flows will be addressed as well as the 
assumptions to compute the WACC value (rates and capital structure). 
 




This is, undoubtedly, the most important assumption to make, since the majority of figures will be 
forecasted based on a relationship with revenues. In the past few years, Illumina has faced a CAGR of 16,5%. 
However, assuming this average growth for the near future is misleading. Each launch of a new product boosts 
sales growth rate for a period of time and then this rate tends to decrease. Therefore, in order to sustain such a 
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high rate, Illumina would have to be launching new successful products every two years, which may be an 
excessively optimistic view. 
According to a market forecast in the Biotechnology industry from BCC Research, a 13,6% CAGR for the 
global market is expected for the next years. Yahoo Finance presents a figure of 17,9% as the growth rate 
estimate for Illumina and a 13,5% growth for the industry. Nevertheless, one has to understand the challenges 
that Illumina will be facing, especially over the next two years. The Budget Control Act affects the funding for 
academic and government institutions. The National Institute of Health (NIH), one of the most preponderant 
clients is no exception. As 80% of Illumina’s customer base is subject to these budget cuts, it may impact the 
firm’s ability to meet the expected sales growth rates. Thus, one should consider a more conservative figure. 
A research from Morgan Stanley assumes budget cuts of approximately 3,5% in 2012 and 5% in 2013. This 
will have impact on the US customer base. However, the management team assumes that Illumina will suffer no 
impact from these budget cuts, which is doubtful. In Europe, there may be some cuts as well but with a lesser 
impact, while in other regions, the reverse situation may occur whereby funding tends to increase, especially 
when it concerns healthcare-related government and academic institutions. 
Other factors that may drive sales growth rates are the development and the launch of new lines, as well 
as the changes in the product mix. The MiSeq, launched in the third quarter of 2011, and HiSeq 2500 whose 
release to the market is expected to start in the second half of 2012 are new sequencing instruments that will 
allow the development of studies of the human genome in less time and at a lower cost, which will therefore be 
very appealing to the market. These products will drive down the Microarray business as they work as substitutes 
to those devices. With this change in the product mix, there will be a positive effect in the gross margin as the 











Taking all this information into consideration and the fact that the company does not provide any figures 
of sales breakdown per product or region, the most conservative estimate of 13,6% growth was taken as a basis 
and relying on the information provided by Morgan Stanley on the End Market Mix distribution of Illumina 
(Fig.11), a weighted average growth rate was computed for each year, accounting for the expected 3,5% and 5% 
budget cuts affecting the sales growth for the “Academic/Govt” and “NIH” customers (Fig.12). For the Terminal 
Fig.11 – End Market Mix of Illumina. 
Source: Morgan Stanley Research 
 













Value, the average of the estimated periods’ growth rates is assumed, leading to a value equal to 10,5%, 
defending the idea that the company will not have a high growth forever and when it reaches a certain maturity, 
lower growth rates will occur. 
 
g (%) Weights 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
NIH and Govt 80% 10,1% 8,6% 9,6% 10,6% 10,5% 
Others 20% 13,6% 13,6% 13,6% 13,6% 10,5% 
Weighted Average 
 
10,8% 9,6% 10,4% 11,2% 10,5% 
Fig.12 – Sales growth rate assumptions for Illumina 
 
Cost of Sales 
 
For the past three years, the average ratio 
of cost of sales as a percentage of revenues was 
equal to 32,6%. On October 2011, the company 
implemented a restructuring plan with the 
objective of reducing workforce by 8% and 
consolidation of facilities. Besides the 
restructuring plan, the change in the product mix 
will lead to lower costs as sequencing products 
and its consumables have a lower production 
cost. When looking at the costs breakdown per 
category (Fig.13), it is fairly easy to deduct that 
the production cost and the cost of buying the raw material for that production (cost of product revenue) 
represent the major bulk of this account. Although no target is specifically defined by the administration, a 
gradually 1,6% improvement in the cost of sales/sales ratio will be assumed, therefore, the target for 2016 will be 
31%. As mentioned before, this improvement in the ratio will be progressive, thus it is expected that the major 
improvements will occur in the first years, implying a gross margin enhancement. Comparing the figures from 




This account will be impacted by two distinct factors already mentioned above. On one hand, the 
restructuring plan and the acquired expertise will allow Illumina to invest less and maintain the performance. On 
the other hand, as this company is still at an early stage in its life cycle, the investment in R&D is essential and 
therefore a target of R&D expenses as 18% of sales is set against the past three years average figure of 19,8%. 
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Income Taxes 
 
The management team states that the current figure for the tax rate will diminish in the following years, 
thus, from a conservative perspective a slight decrease of the tax rate to 34% will be assumed, less 0,6% than the 
average from the past three years. 
 
Depreciation and Capital Expenditures 
 
In order to forecast the values for Depreciation and Capital Expenditures (CAPEX), a ratio of those 
accounts over non-current assets of the previous year was calculated. The past years average led to the figures of 
10,5% for Depreciation and 12,3% for CAPEX. In this phase, it is important to understand whether this value is 
reasonable for future forecasts. Given the fact that the company is still in its growth phase, the CAPEX rate has to 
be higher than the depreciation rate. As the company moves to the long-run, there are fewer investments and in 
a steady state situation, CAPEX is equal to depreciation as investments are to replace worn out capital stock. 
 
Net Working Capital 
  
Net Working Capital (NWC) for each year was calculated with the following formula: 
 
                                                          
  
Then, the changes in net working capital that figure in the Cash Flow Statement were calculated through: 
 




Although the management does not specifically mention the company’s future perspectives regarding its 
capital structure, it is stated that the company has set up a hedge strategy on the convertible senior notes in 
order to avoid dilution and a consequent change in the capital structure. Therefore, it will be assumed that the 
company does not intend to change its D/E ratio. For the calculation of this ratio, Net Debt will be considered as 
Long-term Debt + Short-term Debt – cash. In Illumina’s case, the value assumed as a target capital structure was 
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Discount Rates 
 
For the DCF valuation, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) should be calculated. As previously 
mentioned above, its formula is given by 
  
     
 
 
               
 
 
   
 
Therefore, some assumptions have to be made in order to reach an estimate. Taking into consideration 
the literature review, the cost of equity (    was calculated using the CAPM method and the cost of debt (    
was calculated with Damodaran’s ranking based on the interest coverage ratio of the company. The capital 
structure was already mentioned above. In order to reach those discount rates, the following data were used: 
 
 Risk-free rate – the 10-years rate for the treasury bond of the US government as of 1st of December 2011 
was considered as the riskless asset. 
 Beta – Damodaran provides an unlevered beta for the biotechnology industry (Global) equal to 1,24. 
Reuters has a beta value specifically for the company (0,58), which is significantly lower than the figure 
presented by Damodaran. Since this is a more specific value, concerning Illumina individually, it was 
assumed that the Reuters value for beta should be used, as Damadoran’s figure might be too generic. In 
order to obtain the levered beta for the company, the target D/E ratio was used.  
 Equity Risk Premium (ERP) – Damodaran’s estimate for the US was utilised. It is not considered a specific 
country risk premium. On one hand, the company is based in the US where it retains 50% of its customer 
base; on the other hand, Illumina has a diversified portfolio globally, which diminishes the international 
risk exposure to other countries as well. 
 Cost of debt – the interest coverage ratio (EBIT/Interest Expenses) was calculated and a credit ranking 
was attributed to Illumina according to Damodaran’s ranking. Illumina’s debt is ranked with an A-, which 
implies a premium 1,65% over the risk-free rate, which implies a cost of debt equal to 3.76%. 
 
Terminal Value  
 
For the terminal value, the most difficult matter is to determine when this company will exit its growth 
phase. Assuming that in the future, when a company is in a stable phase, it does not surpass the economy’s 
growth rate, a forecast for GDP growth from the Global Economic Outlook study by The Conference Board was 
taken into consideration. For the period of 2007-2025 the expected GDP growth for Advanced Economies and 
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies is 1,9% and 3,3% respectively. Using the current figure of sales 
breakdown by region as weights for an average growth, the assumed growth rate for the Terminal Value was 
assumed to be 2,24%. 
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4.1.2. Results 
 
After assuming a conservative estimate in all instances, the valuation led to a final price per share of 
$41,18, which compared to the share price of $30,48 in the stock market on the 30th of December of 2011, 
represents 35,1% upside potential. This would lead to the conclusion that the shares may be undervalued in the 
market. One should bear in mind the fact that the main points of uncertainty are related to the R&D pipeline and 
the ability to launch successful new products, which, if the company continues to strive to grow through this 
strategy, there may be even higher upside potential. Accounting for the 139 million shares outstanding, the 




 In order to consider an interval for Illumina’s Equity Value, a sensitivity analysis was performed by 
changing two variables – Operating Margin and Expected Growth for the Terminal Value. Changes were made 
regarding the results from the Base Case. A Bull and Bear perspective were assumed. 
 Bull Case – Operating Margin is assumed to be 2,5% superior against the base case. For instance, 
for the last estimated year (2016) the operating margin will be 29% instead of base case’s 26,5%. 
It considers that there will be a strong demand for Illumina’s products and/or costs reductions will 
be even more effective. The terminal value growth rate adds 0,25% against the Base Case, 
assuming a higher impact of the superior growth rates from emerging markets. 
 Bear Case – Operating Margin is assumed to have the inverse impact of the Bull Case, thus, being 
lower in 2,5% against the Bear Case. This case defends the eventuality that Illumina’s products are 
rejected by the market and/or that there were no additional costs reductions resulting from the 
restructuring plan. For the terminal value growth rate, the Advanced Economies growth was 
assumed. This figure is equal to 1,9%. 
 
Taking into consideration these two scenarios, Illumina’s Share Price range from $33,65 to $48,99, 
representing an upside potential between 10,4% and 60,7% against the $30,48 share price as of the 30th of 
December 2011. 
     
Share Price Variation in the last year 
 
 The market share price for Illumina from 30th of December 2011 up until one year back, ranged from 
$25,96 and $77,88. The estimated prices fit within the range, but as there is a high volatility in the prices, there is 
no strong conclusion to take out of these figures. 
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Multiples Valuation 
 
 After defining a comparable peer group, the average and median multiples of Price/Sales, EV/Sales and 
EV/EBITDA were computed (Fig.14), including and excluding Illumina in the sample. The final result lead to share 
prices between $14 and 31$. 
 Nevertheless, it is important to take into account the specificity of this industry, where companies are not 
absolutely comparable. The core product/technology being sold is differentiated across companies and the 
growth expectations differ a lot as well. The company that, at each moment, is providing the state-of-the-art 
technology is the one that has the competitive advantage, being that reflected in the share price. Illumina has a 
unique technology that cannot be copied by competitors so far, and this may drive its price up in the market. 
 
Fig.14 - Multiples Valuation for Illumina 
Firm Market Cap. EV Sales EBITDA Price/Sales EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Illumina 3530,20 2947,50 1066,80 244,60 3,31 2,76 12,05 
Luminex 894,00 780,30 177,70 20,10 5,03 4,39 38,82 
Agilent 12096,90 11588,90 6615,00 768,00 1,83 1,75 15,09 
Thermo Fisher 17253,30 18464,40 11373,40 2464,00 1,52 1,62 7,49 
Qiagen 3207,40 3145,90 1121,30 331,30 2,86 2,81 9,50 
Perkinelmer 2219,90 2226,10 1851,10 322,50 1,20 1,20 6,90 
Life Technologies 7176,80 9397,30 3703,40 1154,90 1,94 2,54 8,14 
Affymetrix 294,60 354,30 287,30 17,00 1,03 1,23 20,84 
Average (inc. Illumina) 
    
2,34 2,29 14,85 
Median (inc. Illumina)     1,88 2,14 10,77 
Average (exc. Illumina) 
    
2,20 2,22 15,25 
Median (exc. Illumina)     1,83 1,75 9,50 
 
4.2. Standalone Valuation of Roche 
 
A second step in this valuation chapter is to perform the valuation of the acquirer company so that, in a 
third stage, both companies’ values are aggregated, enabling us to arrive at a merged entity, which will then 
incorporate the appropriate synergies of such deal. It is important to take into consideration that, in order to 
merge both companies, their income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement must be as similar as 
possible, thus Roche statements will follow Illumina’s and therefore, some accounts that were originally 
separated in the annual report, were grouped and renamed. 
Roche has been following a stable dividend policy for the past years and, according to the annual report, 
it is the management’s objective to maintain this strategy. Also, a stable D/E ratio was assumed and there is no 
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information regarding possible stock repurchases. In order to put into practice a different valuation model and 
since the conditions aforementioned make it possible, the DCF method using FCFE will be deployed. 
Following the structure from Illumina’s valuation chapter, in the following section there will be an 
explanation of the main CF forecasting and discount rates assumptions. 
 




When looking at the recent past, Roche’s sales have been declining. Although this is a tough market with 
fierce competition, the fact that drove sales down was the strengthening of the Swiss Franc against other 
currencies. If constant exchange rates are assumed, sales actually grew by 1% over the past year. The main 
problem here is the fact that Roche does not disclose detailed information regarding the origin of its sales. There 
is a split for sales between four regions for the pharmaceuticals division and three regions for the diagnostics 
division as it was shown in chapter 3. This considerably increases the difficulty of the forecasting analysis. 
The rationale behind the assumptions made was broken into three different steps. At first, the breakdown 
of sales per region in each segment was taken into consideration and, for each region the corresponding growth 
expectation from IMS Health (see the industry analysis chapter) was applied. Then, a representative currency for 
each region was considered and the depreciation/appreciation to CHF for the past year was accounted to adjust 
the growth rate estimates. Finally, it was possible to arrive to a unique growth rate figure by a weighted average 
on the type of business. For further detail, the calculus of the growth rate is presented in Appendix 4. 
 
Cost of Sales 
 
Roche has been increasing its gross margin 
due to a lower ratio of cost of sales over sales. The 
“Excellence Program” implemented by the company 
allowed them to better allocate resources and save 
costs, and thus become more profitable. Fig.15 
demonstrates the cost of sales breakdown per 
category. Not surprisingly, the manufacturing costs 
and the royalty expenses represent the major share 
in total cost of sales. With expiring royalty 
obligations, it is possible to improve these figures 
and reduce costs. The “other costs” figure has some 






Fig.15 - Cost of Sales Breakdown 
Manufacturing cost of
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one-time cost, it is expected to vanish in the total costs for the following years. Moreover, the “Excellence 
Program” impacts the manufacturing costs and there is still room for improvements according to the 
management team. From 2009 to 2011, cost of sales as a percentage of sales have decreased 1% and a figure of 
1% additional improvements will be assumed. Thus, for the forecasted period, cost of sales will be calculated as 




Although the “Excellence Program” also allowed some cost cutting in R&D, it is the management objective 





There is no information regarding changes in the corporate tax rate the Roche will be paying in the future, 




The Management Team was proud to announce that for the 25th consecutive year there was an increase 
of the dividends amount to be distributed. The payout ratio is quite stable as well and it is set to be 55,3%. For the 
terminal value, the current 3% growth in dividends will be assumed. 
 
Depreciation and CAPEX and Net Working Capital 
 
For these three accounts the same procedures were taken as in Illumina’s valuation. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy point related to the fact that the management team assumes a need for a higher investment in NWC 
in the short-term, mainly due to the fact that the clients in the south of Europe are taking longer to pay their 




As with Illumina, there is no information regarding the objective to maintain or change the D/E ratio. 
However, there is an intention to keep the current investment grade rating. A good assumption that will allow the 
company to pursue this goal is to maintain the current capital structure. Again, Net Debt will be used to compute 
the ratio. The capital structure assumed is given by D/E = 14,50%. 
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Discount Rates 
 
For the DCF valuation, using FCFE, it is necessary to calculate the cost of equity (Re). In order to do so, the 
CAPM formula will be used and, as already stated in the literature review, it is given by: 
 
                      
 
In order to arrive at an appropriate discount rate, the following data was assumed: 
 
 Risk-free rate – the 10-year rate for the treasury bond of the Swiss government as of 1st of December 
2011 was considered as the riskless asset. 
 Beta – The unlevered beta for Roche provided by Reuters was assumed. This figure is equal to 0,71. Then, 
it was relevered, using the target D/E ratio. In order to obtain the levered beta for the company, the 
target D/E ratio was used and a levered beta of approximately 0,79 was estimated.  
 Equity Risk Premium (ERP) – Damodaran’s estimate was again considered. For the US, there is no specific 
country risk for Switzerland and thus the ERP figure was equal to 6,51%. Again, and as for Illumina, 





The final equity value is CHF186.035 mn (Appendix 5). It represents a 37,6% upside potential against the 
market capitalization as of 30th of December 2011. It is important to keep in mind that the sales forecast may be 
subject to some biases. Nevertheless, the importance of this valuation is not to reach an exact value. Instead, it is 
important because it is a necessary intermediate step in order to make a valuation of the merged entity. 
 
4.3. Merged Entity 
 
Having both companies’ respective valuations, the financials for the merged entity are now necessary. 
The first step is to use the same structure in the financial statements, which was already facilitated when some 
changes in the accounts were applied in Roche’s valuation. Then, both firms’ accounts can be added up to 
produce the first phase of the merged entity financials. The second step is to incorporate the synergies 
opportunities that can be exploited through of the deal. By the difference between the valuation result in the 
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4.3.1. Roche and Illumina – Valuation of Both Businesses Together 
 
 Illumina and Roche were valued with different models, thus the first step is to value one of the firms with 
the other’s model. As Roche also assumes a stable D/E ratio, a second valuation of this firm has to be performed 
using the WACC methodology. 
 
WACC-based DCF valuation of Roche 
 
The same assumptions as from the previous model were taken into account and the figures that were 
missing in order to calculate the discount rate, were computed with the same rationale as when Illumina’s 
valuation was performed. For the terminal value, the GDP rationale was taken as basis, but one should bear in 
mind that Roche is in a more mature market and facing tougher competition. Moreover, the continuing 
expectations of CHF’s appreciation against other currencies will also drive the company’s value down in terms of 
CHF. Therefore, a 0,1% growth rate for the terminal value was assumed, taking into consideration a conservative 
perspective once again. 
The result of the WACC valuation (Appendix 7) was similar to the one obtained with the FCFE method, 
accounting for a 0,05% upwards change in Equity Value. A reason for this change could be the fact that the 
leverage effect might drive the enterprise value up, especially in a case like Roche where the firm has a A+ rating 
and a low risk-free interest rate, leading to a cost of debt equal to 1,96%. 
 
WACC for the Merged Entity 
 
Having valued both businesses with the same model, the next step is to sum each company’s accounts 
and discount the FCFF at a WACC for the merged entity. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that both 
firms will keep their capital structure so that the merged entity’s debt and equity values are simply the sum of 
each company’s values. In order to do so, Illumina would have to be bought with 100% Roche’s stocks or through 
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 In Fig.16, a table shows how the WACC for the 
merged firm was determined. For the tax rate figure, 
one of the suggestions by the literature was to choose 
the higher of the two rates. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that since there is a significant difference in both 
companies’ tax rates and as Illumina represents only 
2,5% of the net debt value of the merged entity, it may 
be a biased assumption to consider Illumina’s rate of 
34%, against Roche’s 19%. An alternative may be to 
determine a tax rate weighted on the net debt values of 
each company, leading to a figure equal to 19,45%. The 
cost of debt (Rd) for the merged entity was determined 
as weighted average by net debt and the unlevered 





Finally, there is another change that needs to be made, regarding Cash Flows. As Illumina has its accounts 
in USD and Roche, on the other hand, reports in CHF, it is necessary to have both valued in the same currency, 
otherwise these figures cannot be aggregated. In order to do so, and taking into account the literature review, 
there are two different strategies to convert a firm’s cash flow. As there is the need to merge the accounts, each 




Total Equity Value of the merged entity is equal to CHF 193.163,26 mn, which when compared to the sum 
of both businesses’ equity value independently, there is a difference of 0,88% upwards (Fig.17). This may be due 







Fig.16 – WACC for the merged entity 
 
 
Illumina Roche Merged Entity 
Shares Outstanding 139 849 988 
Equity 4235 135161 139396 
Net Debt 504 19605 20109 
Rd 3,76% 1,96% 2,01% 
Unlevered beta 0,58 0,71 0,71 
D/V 11% 13% 13% 
E/V 89% 87% 87% 
D/E 12% 15% 14% 
Tax Rate 34% 19% 19,45% 
Levered beta 0,63 0,79 0,79 
Rf 2,11% 0,66% 0,66% 
ERP 6,51% 6,51% 6,51% 
Re 6,18% 5,83% 5,79% 
WACC 5,79% 5,29% 5,26% 
g % for TV 2,24% 0,10% 0,16% 
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Fig.17 - Comparison of Equity Values 
 
Equity Ilumina (USD)  $              5.721,88  
Equity Roche (CHF)  SFr.    186.121,04  
Equity Merged Entity (CHF)  SFr.    193.163,26  
Equity Sum of the Two (CHF)  SFr.    191.483,12  
Difference 0,88% 
 
4.3.2. Roche and Illumina – Accounting for Synergies 
 
Having the figures for the merged entity, the synergies will be built in top of these. As has been the 
practice throughout this study, a conservative perspective will be present in every assumption made in this 
chapter, meaning that only well substantiated reasoning should be considered, avoiding speculative synergies. 
Nevertheless, one should avoid being excessively conservative as it may have such a negative impact on the deal 
to the point of questioning its viability. Above all, caution should be present in every assumption in order to avoid 
misinterpretations of the deal. 
Regarding the cost cut programs in Illumina and Roche’s operations above mentioned, these values are 
not considered as synergy since those improvements are related to an already existing efficiency program and are 
not connected to the deal itself. It is important to only consider as synergies the future improvements that are 
directly related with merging both firms. Failing to do so, may lead to an inaccurate valuation of the deal. 
Recalling the Literature Review chapter, synergies can fall into two major groups: operating and financial 
synergies. Taking into account the reasoning of the deal, the focus of the synergies will be based on the operating 
part of it. There are two components affecting the operating margin – revenues in one side and costs on the other 




 This is probably one of the most difficult synergy figures to estimate, as it relies upon certain assumptions 
that are extrinsic to the company, such as market’s reaction towards a certain product or competition moves. An 
advantage today may no longer be relevant one month from now on. 
 The main purpose for this deal, as for Roche’s perspective, is to be able to bring more information to the 
patients’ diagnostics through the usage of the sequencing technology and targeting patients’ needs much more 
efficiently. Providing personalised treatment is certainly something that customers will be willing to pay a 
premium over current prices. Therefore, the major impact will be on Roche’s diagnostics’ segment, where a 1,5% 
increase in prices will be assumed in the first two years, followed by smaller increments in the subsequent years 
as competition reacts to Roche’s moves. It is important to mention that this additional growth is assumed to only 
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impact 24% of Roche’s total sales each year, which corresponds to the diagnostics’ segment weight on Roche’s 
total sales as of 2011. 
On Illumina’s side, there are also opportunities for revenues growth, especially in the Sequencing 
business. As part of Roche’s group it will confer much more visibility to the state-of-the-art Illumina’s sequencing 
machines. This higher exposure will give a boost to MiSeq and HiSeq sales. Also, this deal will allow Illumina to 
enter deeper into new markets. Currently, the company has 50% of its sales across the US. Merging with Roche 
may lead to a higher penetration into European markets. It will be assumed a 1% impact upwards for the first two 
years. As well as in Roche’s case, this impact will be faded towards the subsequent years, as there is always a 
higher peak when a new product is launched but then, those sales growth rates tend to stabilize. Furthermore, 
competition may launch similar products to compete with MiSeq and HiSeq. It is important to take into 
consideration as well that the deal will lead to a lower dependence on Government and Academic Spending and 
thus, there could be some benefits to be reaped, not in sales growth but in terms of less sales reduction due to 
decreasing levels of expenditure in these sectors. 
The table presented in Fig.18 aggregates all the considerations above mentioned. 
  
Fig.18 - Revenue Synergies Assumptions 
 
  2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F 
Merged Entity Revenues (mn CHF) 45165,36 45217,61 45294,83 45398,02 45507,51 
Illumina's weight on sales 2,4% 2,6% 2,9% 3,2% 3,5% 
Roche's weight on sales 97,6% 97,4% 97,1% 96,8% 96,5% 
Sales growth for Illumina 1,0% 1,0% 0,7% 0,4% 0,2% 
Sales growth for Roche 1,5% 1,5% 1,2% 1,2% 1,0% 
Sales growth - synergies 0,4% 0,4% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 




Usually these synergies are related to the optimisation of internal processes and reduction of common 
costs. These changes in the cost structure normally have the major impact in the first years after the deal, tending 
to zero in the long term, when the companies are totally integrated. 
The most usual cost synergies are related with the General and Administration costs account, where the 
common costs arise. Administration and marketing costs can be reduced through headcount reductions. In the 
Roche & Illumina deal this also applies as there may be overlapping operations in some regions, especially in the 
US and Europe. Also, there can be some opportunities regarding products’ distribution as an integrated logistic 
plan may lead to lower distribution costs. Nevertheless, this is not the main focus point for this merger, where 
revenue synergies are the main reason for the interest in this deal. It will be assumed that the integration of the 
aspects mentioned above will lead to a 0,05% cost cut for each estimation year. Regarding other markets, there 
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may be no cost reduction as emerging markets are the basis of most growth for the years to come. Therefore, 
there is no reason to reduce the investment in these regions. 
R&D expenses are assumed to have a 1% reduction in total value. One should recall that Roche intends to 
maintain a stable ratio of R&D investment as a percentage of sales, and therefore it is not expected an aggressive 
change in this account. Instead of its current 19% ratio, R&D will represent around 18,7% of sales. The 1% 
reduction represents a part of Roche’s R&D investment in genome sequencing investigation that will be 
substituted by Illumina’s technology. Also, it would be a substantial risk to divest in R&D in a merger, leading 
sometimes to the failure of such deals. Roche is making an offer to Illumina due to its innovative technologies and 
the ability to develop breakthrough products and tools. Therefore, restricting the ability to develop those 
technologies would be an untimely move.  
Finally, regarding cost of sales, no reduction will be considered. A large proportion of this account is 
represented by the costs of buying the necessary materials to develop the firms’ products and the production 
itself.  As both companies’ products are distinct, it will be assumed that its production costs will not be 
overlapped. 
 
4.3.3. Inferring the Value of Synergies 
 
 Having the firm value for the merged entity with and 
without synergies, one can infer the total amount of synergies by 
the difference between both values. In this case, the total amount 
of synergies is equal to CHF 3521 mn. Applying the synergies’ 
assumptions mentioned above one at a time, it is possible to 
divide this total amount into three categories in order to 
understand the contribution of each assumption to the final value. 
Looking at Fig.19, it is possible to conclude that Revenue 
Synergies have the largest impact. As the main reason for Roche 
to acquire Illumina is the opportunity to develop a customised product and being able to apply a higher price to 
its drugs and diagnostics products, it makes sense that revenues synergies have such an important position in the 
synergies breakdown. R&D synergies assume some importance as well, since buying Illumina’s technology 
functions as a substitute for R&D investment. 
 
4.3.4. Integration Costs 
 
One important aspect to consider is the fact that there are costs in order to achieve synergies. 




Fig.19 - Synergies Breakdown 
Revenue R&D G&A Costs
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attached to it. One example is related with cost synergies through headcount reductions, which implies 
compensation fees to be paid.  
These integration costs depend on the acquirer’s ability to incorporate the target company and they occur 
during the first years after the deal takes place. In order to determine these costs, one can look for past deals and 
assess how much the acquirer has spent to integrate the target firm. 
In 2009 Roche acquired Genentech and the integration costs were CHF 3.011 mn spread across the first 
two years after the deal. It represents 28,6% of Genentech’s sales in the year before the deal. Applying this ratio 
in Illumina’s sales as of 2011, one comes to a value equal to CHF 302 mn, which will be equally spread across the 
first two years of estimation (Appendix 10). 
After taking into consideration these integration costs, it is possible to come up with figures for net 
synergies. In Fig.20 it is possible to assess the breakdown of synergies value by category, as well as the value of 
net synergies that include integration costs, which are relatively small when comparing with the accrued value 
from synergies, since integration costs only occur in the first years of the deal, while synergies hold for a longer 
period. 
 
Fig.20 - Synergies breakdown by category 
 
Synergies 
Equity Value Synergy 
(million CHF) Without Syn. With Syn. 
Revenue 193163 194764 1600 
R&D 193163 194347 1183 
G&A Costs 193163 193900 737 
Total Synergies     3521 
Integration Costs 193163 192966 -197 





Estela Lucas M&A: The Roche’s Offer for Illumina 40 
5. The Acquisition 
 
After developing the valuation of both companies and after determining the value of synergies, in this 
chapter it will be addressed how much should Roche offer to Illumina’s shareholders and in which terms. There 
will be also a final comment on the execution risk of such deal. 
 
5.1. How much should Roche pay? 
 
Illumina’s market capital is valued at $5.722 mn, which represents a 35% upside potential regarding the 
market value by the end of 2011. Moreover, synergies estimates point to a figure around $3.547 mn, which 
represents 84% of Illumina’s market capital. At a first look, this could mean that Roche should be willing to pay a 
premium of 119% over market value by the 30th of December 2011. This would represent a maximum offer equal 
to $66,71 per share. 
 
Fig.21 - Relationship between Illumina's Premium and Offer Price 
 
Illumina's Premium 
Market Cap. (Market Value)  $         4.235  
Market Cap. (DCF Valuation)  $         5.722  
Upside Potential 35% 
Total Net Synergies  $         3.547  
% Market Cap. (Market Value) 84% 
Total Premium over Market Cap. 119% 
Offer: max price/share  $         66,71  
  
This would be a misleading conclusion however. Some additional aspects have to be taken into 
consideration when deciding which should be the final offer. Some of those matters will be analysed as follows. 
 
Sharing Synergies Value 
 
The value of synergies is created through the merge of both companies. The premium that comes from 
there should be divided between both firms’ shareholders depending on how much each company is responsible 
for the existence of those synergies. It is important to evaluate the uniqueness of synergies, i.e. if one of the firms 
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Fig.22 - Illumina's Contribution for Synergies' creation 
 
Synergies Value Illumina's Share Synergy for Illumina 
Revenue  $         1.708  80%  $                           1.366  
R&D  $         1.263  70%  $                               884  
G&A Costs  $             787  0%  $                                  -    
Total  $         3.757  60%  $                           2.250  
Integration Costs      $                             -126  
Total Net Synergies      $                           2.124  
% Market Cap of Illumina     50% 
 
Fig.22 identifies Illumina’s contribution for Synergies’ creation. Regarding revenues, Illumina should reap 
the major stake of the synergies, since it has the technology that will allow Roche to develop the personalised 
medicines. R&D reduction will mostly happen on Roche’s side. However, it is only possible due to the 
incorporation of Illumina’s know-how in biotechnology. At last instance, if Roche does not acquire Illumina, it will 
have to put more effort in R&D investments, trying to develop a technology similar to the one of Illumina. On the 
other hand, G&A cost reductions are mainly related to Roche as it is the one who has the bigger structure built 
and ready to be used and incorporate Illumina’s operations, thus Illumina does not really have an uniquess factor 
in this part of synergies as it would happen likewise with another company.  
As a conclusion, Illumina’s shareholders should only capture 60% of synergies’ value added. Also, this 
percentage of integration costs should be carried by Illumina.    
With this process, the total premium over Illumina’s Market Capital is 50% against the previously figure of 
84%. This means that the maximum Roche would be willing to pay per share is $56,47 (Fig.23). 
 
Fig.23 - Final Offer for the Acquisition 
 
(in USD) 
Market Cap. (Market Value)  $         4.235 mn  
Market Cap. (DCF Valuation)  $         5.722 mn 
Upside Potential 35% 
Synergies Value Added for Roche  $         2.124 mn 
% Market Cap. (Market Value) 50% 
Total Premium over Market Cap. 85% 
Offer Price  $         56,47  
 
The total premium over market capital may seem excessive. However, if we consider the average share 
price of Illumina of the six months before the deal ($43,05), the total premium would only represent 55% of the 
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Target Shareholders 
 
It is important to analyse the type of shareholders and if they are willing to sell the company where they 
have their stake. Illumina’s major shareholders are Investment Banks, Investment Funds and Venture Capitalists. 
Usually, these investors intend to have an exit strategy that may pass through the sale of their stakes for a 
significant premium, thus they may not create a barrier to the deal. However, if the offer price is not perceived as 
fair, those shareholders will reject it, expecting that the company will deliver higher returns simply by its organic 
growth. 
 
Method of payment 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, there are two methods of payment in M&A deals: 
 Equity financed transactions, i.e. paying with stocks. This tends to signal overpriced stocks, which, 
apparently, is not Roche’s case. Also, paying with stock means that target shareholders will 
capture risk and synergies from the deal, which in one hand signals uncertainty about the 
successfulness of the deal and, on the other hand, if there is such certainty, it is not the wisest 
decision to share those gains. 
 Cash offers. Usually it represents the acquirer’s confidence in the deal. Also, as there may be new 
debt issuances, there is a superior pressure to achieve the proposed synergies. 
 
It seems that it is at utmost interest of Roche to acquire Illumina with a cash offer, since, as seen before, 
most of the synergies shall be captured by Roche’s shareholders and there is a high likelihood for the synergies to 
materialise. Also, Roche’s stocks seem to be underpriced, which acts as another factor to avoid the Equity 
financed transaction. 
 
5.2. Structure of the Final Offer 
 
Taking into account all the previous considerations, the final offer should stand around $56,47 per share, 
which would represent a 85% (35% for the fair value plus 50% for the synergies) premium over Illumina’s market 
cap as of the 30th of December 2011. Roche should finance its offer with 100% cash as the new entity is capable to 
support additional leverage and Roche’s shareholders would capture most of the synergies from the deal. In order 
to assess whether Roche can finance its offer with 100% cash, it is necessary to evaluate the debt capacity for the 
merged entity. Fig.23 shows the total of additional debt that Roche can commit to, maintaining its investment 
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Fig.24 – Debt Capacity for the new entity 




Merged Entity with 
additional leverage 
Cash 303 4.113 4.416 
 
4.416 
Net Debt 504 20.920 21.424 
 
43.424 
EBITDA 269 16.884 17.153 
 
17.153 
Net Interest Costs 24 2.773 2.797 
 
5.670 
EBIT 200 14.357 14.557 
 
14.557 
Interest Coverage 8,3 5,2 5,2 > 2,5 2,6 
Net Debt/EBITDA 1,9 1,2 1,2 < 4,0 2,5 
USD/CHF = 0,9371 
   
Additional Debt 22.000 
 
With the suggested offer price, the deal totals $7.846 mn, which is way below the additional debt that 
Roche can acquire. Therefore, it is possible to finance the deal with 100% cash. 
 
5.3. Execution Risk 
In every deal, there are some risks that should be considered. This is an important issue, especially for 
Roche that will make an enormous investment into buying Illumina and if most of the value added will be 
captured by its shareholders, so does the risk.  
For this deal to be successful, Roche should approach Illumina with a fair offer for the acquisition. Failing 
to do and both companies may not reach an agreement, at the same time that competition may prepare a move 
to acquire Illumina with a better offer.  
Once the deal is closed, the main risk is related with the integration of operations as there is a mix of 
different cultures and business practices. One of the premises for cost synergies is related with headcount 
reductions. It is normal that most of the dismissed workers will be from Illumina and this may demotivate other 
workers from this company. Also, if Roche forces its culture into Illumina, the second may lose the creational 
spirit that allowed them to innovate and develop its existing products. Moreover, there may be different 
compensation systems for employees and it is necessary to come to a common ground where both parts will not 
feel harm by corporate changes. 
Mostly, it is important to move quickly in order to avoid competition, make ascertained decisions and 
integrate teams and different cultures in a process as smooth as possible. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation addressed M&A concepts with two approaches. Firstly, a broad analysis of Literature was 
developed in order to present the most important notions about this topic. Secondly, this theory was applied in a 
real case – Roche’s attempt to acquire Illumina. Both companies were valued, as well as the possible merged 
entity and its synergies. Finally, a target price was suggested along with the financing of the deal. 
 Roche has an immense interest in acquiring Illumina as this company developed a state of the art product 
that is able to analyse the human genome in a fast and accurate way. It is at Roche’s interest to take advantage of 
this technology and developed drugs that are customised to each patient accordingly to his/her DNA, being thus 
more efficient. This would give Roche a strong competitive advantage over competitors and it would allow the 
company to apply a premium in current prices for its medicines. 
 Although Illumina is a small firm in the biotechnology industry, it is an important player as other firms 
cannot compete with its technology yet. Therefore, Illumina’s growth opportunities are large and there are very 
good perspectives for its future. 
 Roche made its first offer to acquire Illumina at $44,5 per share in January of 2012, which was 
immediately rejected by Illumina’s Board. In fact, shares price in the market were around $55 by the end of 
January, reinforcing Roche inability to be successful with the deal. By the end of March, the Swiss pharmaceutical 
raised the offer price to $51 per share, which kept being rejected by the Board. Although investors believed that if 
Roche walked away from the deal, Illumina’s would be valued between $38 and $421, it was also a consensus that 
a possible merger could compensate them with a higher premium. 
 Roche seemed to walk away from the deal until last December when it made a final offer of $66 per 
share, which was once again rejected as Illumina asked for $75 per share. It is still uncertain whether the deal will 
materialise as Roche seemed to have given up definitely.  
 Nevertheless, the most important conclusion to take out of this dissertation is how to develop the 
valuation of a potential deal, identifying the gains and risks from it and clarifying how they are shared among 
investors of both entities. The rationale behind company valuation is complex and there is not a consensus about 
the most accurate model or the most reliable assumptions. Although it is impossible to guess the future, one can 






   
                                                          
1
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-illumina-roche-idUSBRE83H0RP20120418 (18th of April 2012) 
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7. Appendix 
 
1. Illumina’s Income Statement 
 
Illumina's Consolidated Income Statement for the Year Ended (in millions of USD) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F 
Sales 666 903 1.056 1.170 1.282 1.416 1.574 1.740 
g%   35,6% 16,9% 10,8% 9,6% 10,4% 11,2% 10,5% 
Cost of Sales 212 301 346 377 408 446 491 539 
% sales 31,8% 33,3% 32,8% 32,2% 31,8% 31,5% 31,2% 31,0% 
Gross Profit 454 602 710 793 875 970 1.083 1.200 
Research and Development 141 178 197 215 235 258 285 313 
% sales 21,2% 19,7% 18,7% 18,4% 18,3% 18,2% 18,1% 18,0% 
General and Administration Costs 176 220 262 287 314 347 386 426 
% sales 26,4% 24,4% 24,8% 24,7% 24,7% 24,6% 24,6% 24,5% 
Headquarter Relocation Expense 0 0 42 25 0 0 0 0 
Restructuring charges 0 0 8 14 0 0 0 0 
Acquisition related expense (gain), net 11 (9) 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 126 213 200 252 326 365 412 461 
Operating Margin 18,9% 23,6% 18,9% 21,6% 25,4% 25,8% 26,2% 26,5% 
Interest Income 11 8 7 8 8 9 9 10 
Interest Expense (24) (25) (35) (63) (69) (70) (71) (72) 
Other (expense) income, net 1 (10) (39) (5) 0 0 0 0 
Profit Before Taxes 114 186 133 192 265 304 351 399 
Income Taxes 42 60 46 65 90 103 119 136 
Implicit tax rate 36,8% 32,3% 34,6% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 34,0% 
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2. Illumina’s Balance Sheet 
 
Illumina's Consolidated Balance Sheet for the Year Ended (in millions of USD) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F 
Non-current Assets       
    
  
Property, Plan and Equipment 117 130 143 177 195 215 239 264 
Goodwill and Other Assets 331 451 508 576 632 697 775 857 
Total Non-Current Assets 448 581 651 754 826 912 1.014 1.121 
Current Assets       
    
  
Cash and Cash Equivalents 145 249 303 304 334 368 410 453 
Accounts Receivable 158 166 174 228 250 276 307 340 
Inventories 93 142 129 163 179 198 220 243 
Other Current Assets 586 702 938 993 1.088 1.201 1.336 1.476 
Total Current Assets 982 1.259 1.544 1.689 1.851 2.044 2.273 2.511 
Total Assets 1.430 1.840 2.195 2.443 2.677 2.956 3.287 3.632 
Non-current Liabilities       
    
  
Long-term Debt 0 0 807 807 807 807 807 807 
Other non-current Liabilities 125 107 76 147 162 178 198 219 
Total Non-Current Liabilities 125 107 883 954 969 985 1.005 1.026 
Current Liabilities       
    
  
Accounts Payable 53 67 50 78 86 95 106 117 
Accrued Liabilities 98 156 187 194 212 235 261 288 
Long-term Debt, current portion 290 312 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Current Liabilities 441 535 237 272 298 329 366 405 
Total Liabilities 566 642 1.120 1.227 1.267 1.315 1.372 1.431 
Net Assets 864 1.198 1.075 1.216 1.410 1.641 1.915 2.201 
Equity       
    
  
Common Equity 864 1.198 1.075 1.216 1.410 1.641 1.915 2.201 
Total Equity 864 1.198 1.075 1.216 1.410 1.641 1.915 2.201 
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3. Illumina’s Cash Flow Statement and FCFF Valuation 
 
Illumina's Cash Flow Statement (in millions of USD) 
  2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F TV 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 252 326 365 412 461 461 
  
     
  
Tax Rate 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 
Depreciation 68 79 87 96 107 107 
Capex 80 93 102 112 125 107 
Changes Working Capital 60 30 36 42 44 44 
              
FCFF 94 171 191 214 242 266 
PV 89,31 153,22 161,03 170,48 182,59 5646,22 
  
     
  
NPV 6402,86       
% of NPV                        0,01          0,02         0,03         0,03         0,03                0,88    
  
     
  
Outstanding Shares 139 million 
   
  
E/V 89,4% 
    
  
Equity Value  $              5.721,88  
    
  
Price per Share  $                    41,18  
    
  
Market Share Price  $                    30,48  
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4. Sales Growth Assumptions for Roche 
 
Per Region and type of business and accounting for Swiss Franc appreciation/depreciation 
   
Pharmaceuticals 77% g (%) Currencies 
% change 
(2011/2010) 





US 37% 1% USD/CHF 1,1% by Region   
by type of 
business 
  
  Western Europe 25% 3% EUR/CHF -3,2% 
    
  Japan 12% 2% JPY/CHF 6,1%   
   
  International 26% 12% BRL/CHF -2,9%   
   
  
Diagnostics 23% g (%) Currencies 
% change 
(2011/2010) 
Weighted Average -0,2% 
  
  EMEA 50% 7% EUR/CHF -3,2% by Region   
  
  North America 18% 1% USD/CHF 1,1%   
   
  Rest of the World 32% 12% BRL/CHF -2,9% 
    
  
           
Currencies 2010 2011 % Change 
       USD/CHF 0,93 0,94 1,1% 
       EUR/CHF 1,25 1,21 -3,2% 
       JPY/CHF 0,0115 0,0122 6,1% 
       BRL/CHF 0,561 0,545 -2,9% 
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5. Roche Income Statement and FCFE valuation 
 
Roche Group's Consolidated Income Statement for the Year Ended 31st December (in millions of CHF) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F 
Sales 51.151 49.167 44.113 44.069 44.025 43.981 43.937 43.893 
g%   -3,9% -10,3% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% 
Cost of Sales 14.615 13.293 11.942 11.458 11.446 11.435 11.424 11.412 
% sales 28,6% 27,0% 27,1%           
Gross Profit 36.536 35.874 32.171 32.611 32.578 32.546 32.513 32.481 
Research and Development 9.874 10.026 8.326 8.373 8.365 8.356 8.348 8.340 
% sales 19,3% 20,4% 18,9%           
General and Administration Costs 14.385 12.362 10.391 10.400 10.390 10.379 10.369 10.359 
% sales 28,1% 25,1% 23,6% 23,4% 23,3% 23,2% 23,1% 23,0% 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 12.277 13.486 13.454 13.838 13.824 13.810 13.796 13.782 
Operating Margin 24,0% 27,4% 30,5% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 31,4% 
Associated Companies 0 (3) 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Interest Income 554 557 647 589 589 588 587 587 
Interest Expenses (2.599) (2.829) (2.228) (2.015) (1.805) (1.464) (1.356) (1.210) 
Profit Before Taxes 10.232 11.211 11.885 12.424 12.619 12.946 13.039 13.171 
Income Taxes 1.722 2.320 2.341 2.370 2.407 2.469 2.487 2.512 
Implicit tax rate 16,8% 20,7% 19,7% 19,1% 19,1% 19,1% 19,1% 19,1% 
Net Income 8.510 8.891 9.544 10.054 10.212 10.477 10.552 10.659 
  
       
  
Payout Ratio    55,3% 55,3% 55,3% 55,3% 55,3% 
Dividends       5.560 5.647 5.794 5.835 5.895 
  
    
2% 3% 1% 1% 
Dividends growth for TV 3% 
      
  
Rf 0,66% 
      
  
ERP 6,51% 
      
  
Levered Beta 0,79 
      
  
Re 5,83% 
      
  
Present Value 
   
5253,89 5042,44 4888,15 4652,27 166198,52 
Sum of PV 186035,3 
      
  
Shares Outstanding 849 
      
  
Price 219,12 
      
  
  
       
  
Market Share Price 159,2 
      
  
Upside Potential 37,6%         
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6. Roche’s Balance Sheet 
 
Roche Group's Consolidated Balance Sheet for the Year Ended 31st December (in millions of CHF) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F 
Non-current Assets                 
Property, Plan and Equipment 17.697 16.729 16.201 15.475 15.460 15.444 15.429 15.414 
Goodwill and Other Assets 18.389 16.679 17.143 15.973 15.957 15.941 15.925 15.909 
Total Non-Current Assets 36.086 33.408 33.344 31.448 31.417 31.385 31.354 31.322 
Current Assets       
    
  
Cash and Cash Equivalents 2.442 1.841 3.854 2.535 2.532 2.530 2.527 2.525 
Accounts Receivable 10.461 9.403 9.799 10.577 10.126 9.676 9.227 9.040 
Inventories 5.648 4.972 5.060 4.792 4.788 4.783 4.778 4.773 
Other Current Assets 19.928 11.396 9.519 12.298 12.285 12.273 12.261 12.248 
Total Current Assets 38.479 27.612 28.232 30.201 29.731 29.261 28.793 28.587 
Total Assets 74.565 61.020 61.576 61.649 61.147 60.647 60.147 59.909 
Non-current Liabilities       
    
  
Long-term Debt 36.143 27.857 23.459 21.261 16.037 14.392 12.148 8.798 
Other non-current Liabilities 6.941 6.523 7.425 6.415 6.408 6.402 6.396 6.389 
Total Non-Current Liabilities 43.084 34.380 30.884 27.676 22.445 20.794 18.544 15.187 
Current Liabilities       
    
  
Accounts Payable 2.300 2.068 2.053 1.962 1.960 1.958 1.956 1.954 
Accrued and other Current Liabilities 19.767 12.910 14.157 14.248 14.234 14.220 14.205 14.191 
Total Current Liabilities 22.067 14.978 16.210 16.210 16.194 16.178 16.162 16.145 
Total Liabilities 65.151 49.358 47.094 43.886 38.639 36.972 34.705 31.333 
Net Assets 9.414 11.662 14.482 17.764 22.508 23.675 25.441 28.577 
Equity       
    
  
Common Equity 9.414 11.662 14.482 17.764 22.508 23.675 25.441 28.577 
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7. Roche’s Cash Flow Statement and FCFF Valuation 
 
Roche's Cash Flow Statement (in millions of CHF) 
  2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F TV 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 13838 13824 13810 13796 13782 13782 
  
     
  
Tax Rate 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
Depreciation 2361 2227 2224 2222 2220   
Capex 3181 3000 2997 2994 2991   
Changes Working Capital 1920 -451 -450 -449 -187 -187 
              
FCFF 8458 10864 10853 10842 10569 11352 
PV 8032,56 9799,97 9297,86 8821,47 8167,19 168998,75 
  
     
  
NPV 213118 
    
  
% of NPV 3,8% 4,6% 4,4% 4,1% 3,8% 79,3% 
  
     
  
Outstanding Shares 849 millions 
   
  
E/V 87,33% 
    
  
Price per Share 219,22 
    
  
  
     
  
Market Share Price 159,20 
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8. Merged Entity Income Statement 
 
Merged Entity's Income Statement for the Year Ended (in millions of CHF) 
  2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F 
Exchange Rate (USD/CHF) 0,9371 0,9301 0,9282 0,9282 0,9282 
  
    
  
Sales 45165 45218 45295 45398 45508 
Cost of Sales 11811 11826 11849 11879 11913 
Gross Profit 33354 33392 33446 33519 33595 
Research and Development 8575 8583 8596 8612 8630 
General and Administration Costs 10669 10682 10701 10727 10754 
Headquarter Relocation Expense 23 0 0 0 0 
Restructuring charges 13 0 0 0 0 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 14074 14127 14149 14179 14210 
Operating Margin 31,16% 31,24% 31,24% 31,23% 31,23% 
Associated Companies 12 12 12 12 12 
Interest Income 597 596 596 596 596 
Interest Expense -2074 -1869 -1529 -1422 -1277 
Other (expense) income, net -5 0 0 0 0 
Profit Before Taxes 12604 12865 13228 13365 13542 
Income Taxes 2451 2502 2573 2599 2634 
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9. Merged Entity Cash Flow Statement – Without Synergies 
 
Merged Entity's Cash Flow Statement (in millions of CHF) - Without Synergies 
  2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F TV 
Exchange Rate (USD/CHF) 0,9371 0,9301 0,9282 0,9282 0,9282 0,9282 
  
     
  
Operating Profit (EBIT) 14074 14127 14149 14179 14210 14210 
  
     
  
Tax Rate 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
Depreciation 2425 2300 2305 2311 2319 2319 
Capex 3256 3087 3092 3098 3107 2319 
Changes Working Capital 1977 -423 -417 -410 -146 -146 
              
FCFF 8529 11016 11028 11044 10804 11611 
PV 8102,19 9941,92 9454,53 8995,03 8359,40 176175,63 
  
     
  
NPV 221029 
    
  
% of NPV                        0,04         0,04         0,04         0,04         0,04             0,80    
  
     
  
Outstanding Shares 988 million 
   
  
E/V 87% 
    
  
Equity Value 193163,26 
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10. Merged Entity Cash Flow Statement – With Synergies 
 
Merged Entity's Cash Flow Statement (in millions of CHF) - With Synergies 
  2012F 2013F 2014F 2015F 2016F TV 
Exchange Rate (USD/CHF) 0,9371 0,9301 0,9282 0,9282 0,9282 0,9282 
  
     
  
Sales 45335 45388 45431 45530 45616 45616 
Cost of Sales 11811 11826 11849 11879 11913 11913 
Gross Profit 33524 33562 33582 33651 33703 33703 
Research and Development 8489 8497 8510 8526 8544 8544 
General and Administration Costs 10616 10629 10648 10673 10701 10701 
Headquarter Relocation Expense 23 0 0 0 0 0 
Restructuring charges 13 0 0 0 0 0 
Integration Costs 151 151 0 0 0 0 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 14232 14285 14424 14451 14459 14459 
Operating Margin 31,39% 31,47% 31,75% 31,74% 31,70% 31,70% 
  
     
  
Tax Rate 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
Depreciation 2425 2300 2305 2311 2319 2319 
Capex 3256 3087 3092 3098 3107 2319 
Changes Working Capital 1977 -423 -417 -410 -146 -146 
              
FCFF 8656 11144 11249 11263 11004 11812 
PV 8222,90 10057,29 9644,67 9173,57 8514,38 179219,59 
  
     
  
NPV 224832 
    
  
% of NPV                        0,04           0,04           0,04          0,04          0,04             0,80    
  
     
  
Outstanding Shares 988 million 
   
  
E/V 87% 
    
  
Equity Value 196487,42 
    
  
Price per Share 198,89           
 
 
11. Final Offer for the Acquisition – premium compared to 6months average share price of Illumina 
 
Illumina's Premium 
Market Cap. (Market Value)  $         5.981  
Market Cap. (DCF Valuation)  $         5.722  
Upside Potential -4% 
Total Net Synergies  $         3.547  
% Market Cap. (Market Value) 59% 
Total Premium over Market Cap. 55% 
Offer: max price/share  $         66,71  
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